U.S. Walks Fine Line Sharing Intelligence With Ukraine in War With Russia

Revelations this past week that Ukraine used American intelligence to locate and strike the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, the Moskva, and to conduct strikes that killed Russian generals on the battlefield have heightened focus on what the officials said is a virtually unprecedented pipeline of data being sped from U.S. spy agencies to Ukraine’s government.

While U.S. officials openly publicized declassified intelligence about Russia’s plans in the lead-up to its Feb. 24 invasion and in the war’s early weeks, they have been more cautious about describing its battlefield intelligence exchange with Kyiv. Administration spokespersons pushed back vigorously against suggestions Washington was instructing Ukraine on which Russian military platforms to attack or personnel to kill.

White House press secretary

Jen Psaki

said the U.S. didn’t give Ukraine “specific targeting information” regarding the Moskva, and didn’t have prior knowledge of Kyiv’s intent to attack the ship, which sank in mid-April after Ukrainian forces struck it with two Neptune missiles.

“We do provide a range of intelligence to help them understand the threat posed by Russian ships in the Black Sea and help them prepare to defend themselves against potential sea-based assaults,” she said.

As the war grinds through its third month, and the Ukrainians take possession of more advanced weaponry being dispatched by Washington and its allies, it can’t be determined whether the Biden administration can continue to strike what U.S. officials acknowledge is a tricky balance. Mr. Putin isn’t likely to appreciate the nuance in U.S. intelligence-sharing policy, former officials said, heightening the risks that Moscow sees the Biden administration’s direct involvement in attacks that kill Russian soldiers and sailors.

“The way we see it, we’re giving them tactical intelligence—which is, there’s a command center here, there’s a naval vessel there,” said Dan Hoffman, a retired senior Central Intelligence Agency officer who served in Russia. “They make their own decisions.”

Moscow doesn’t view the exchange the same way, however, Mr. Hoffman said. “The key is how the Russians see this, and they want to see this as a proxy war with the United States.”

The Biden administration has also tried to straddle a line in supplying weapons to Ukraine. It has sought to avoid arms that could strike deep into Russia or that Moscow might see as escalatory, such as combat jet fighters.

While Washington has supplied weapons and engaged in intense intelligence sharing with partners before, such as with Iraqi and Afghan counterterrorism units, the rapidly escalating war in Ukraine presents the prospect of direct confrontation with Russia.

The U.S. last month moved to significantly expand the intelligence it provides Ukraine so Kyiv could target Moscow’s forces in Russian-occupied Donbas and Crimea. U.S. officials, citing security concerns, haven’t detailed the information they are sharing, although it is known to include satellite imagery and almost certainly communications intercepts as well.

U.S. officials have outlined only a handful of limits on the intelligence partnership. The U.S., they say, doesn’t provide Ukraine with information that would help it strike targets on Russian territory. Washington also doesn’t share information to help Ukraine target Russia’s top tier of military and civilian leaders, they said.

The U.S. stance on intelligence-sharing, as well as its provision of billions of dollars in weapons to Ukraine, is part of a Biden administration effort to impose steep costs on Russia’s military for its invasion without sparking conflict between the world’s two leading nuclear-armed powers.

“We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Defense Secretary

Lloyd Austin

said after a late-April visit to Kyiv with Secretary of State

Antony Blinken.

Current and U.S. officials also cautioned against underestimating Ukraine’s own intelligence capabilities, which improved after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and destabilization of the Donbas, with help from the U.S. military and the CIA.

“It’s a big mistake to underestimate the significant intelligence capabilities the Ukrainians themselves have,” CIA director

William Burns

said Saturday at an event organized by the Financial Times newspaper.

Mr. Burns also criticized reporting in the news media about the intelligence sharing: “It is irresponsible, it’s risky, it’s dangerous when people talk too much.”

Douglas London, a retired 34-year CIA operations officer, said it is clear that the U.S. is giving Ukraine tracking of potential targets, but unclear if that includes data such as live feeds from drones, which Washington has shared with partners in the past.

For the CIA, he said, there is an important distinction between working with proxy forces and working with partners, as in the case of Ukraine.

Proxy military units fall under U.S. command and control, and have to abide by U.S. laws and policies, Mr. London said.

Partners have more latitude.

“There’s no wink-wink, nod-nodding” when the U.S. provides Ukraine intelligence on the disposition of Russian forces, he said. “We’re not telling them to do it…They’re a sovereign nation, they have an independent agenda.”

—Catherine Lucey contributed to this article.

Write to Warren P. Strobel at Warren.Strobel@wsj.com