BOSTON — Jayson Tatum had a simple solution for the Boston Celtics to bounce back with a win in Game 5 of the NBA Finals on Monday night — he just needs to play better.
“I mean, I give [the Golden State Warriors] credit,” Tatum said after Boston’s 107-97 loss to Golden State in Game 4 at TD Garden on Friday night knotted the series at 2-2. “They’re a great team. They’re playing well. They got a game plan, things like that.
“But it’s on me. I got to be better. I know I’m impacting the game in other ways, but I got to be more efficient, shoot the ball better, finish at the rim better.
“I take accountability for that.”
Tatum has not played to the standard he has set for himself in this series. He is shooting 34% from the field, and although he has passed the ball beautifully in Boston’s two wins, compiling 22 assists and four turnovers, he has nine assists and 10 turnovers in their two losses.
Tatum, along with the rest of the Celtics, short-circuited in the fourth quarter Friday night, making just two shots over the final seven minutes. That allowed Golden State to close the game with a 21-6 run, flipping the outcome in its favor to even the series.
“We obviously felt like we put ourselves in the position to win the game,” said Tatum, who was 1-for-5 in the fourth quarter. “There’s a lot of things we wish we would have done differently, especially on the offensive end. I think we just got way too stagnant late in the fourth from everybody.”
All of that, however, starts with Tatum, who earned MVP honors in the Eastern Conference finals and is the face of the Celtics franchise. He has been shown as the opposite number of Warriors star Stephen Curry throughout this series, but on the court Curry has been peerless.
That was certainly the case in Game 4, when Curry had 43 points, 10 rebounds and four assists and dominated every second he was on the court. Tatum’s night, meanwhile, was emblematic of Boston’s poor decision-making for much of the game. He had five turnovers and was a big part of the team’s stagnant offense down the stretch.
Asked if he is putting too much pressure on himself, Tatum said no and that he just has to be better.
“I think that’s just as simple as it is,” he said. “I just got to be better. I know I can be better, so it’s not like I, myself or my team is asking me to do something I’m not capable of. They know the level and I know the level that I can play at.
“It’s kind of on me to do that more often than not just to help my team in the best way that I can. It’s not too much pressure at all. It’s kind of like my job.”
When asked what he has seen from Tatum so far in this series, Celtics coach Ime Udoka pointed to his hunting for fouls instead of trying to finish through contact.
“At times he’s looking for fouls,” Udoka said. “They are a team that loads up in certain games. He’s finding the outlets. Shooting over two, three guys. That’s the balance of being aggressive and picking your spots and doing what he’s done in previous games, which is kicked it out and got wide-open looks.
“That’s the ongoing theme, so to speak. Him getting to the basket, being a scorer as well as a playmaker. They do a good job with their rotations. Sometimes hunting fouls instead of going to finish. I’ve seen that in a few games so far.”
Moving forward, what the Celtics need to see is the Tatum who showed up time and time again in big spots earlier in these playoffs, such as his 46-point effort in Milwaukee in Game 6 of the Eastern Conference semifinals to stave off elimination against Giannis Antetokounmpo and the defending champion Bucks.
A similar performance in Game 5 in San Francisco on Monday night could allow Boston a chance to close this series out back in Boston next Thursday in Game 6.
Tatum said he remains confident he and the Celtics can bounce back.
“We don’t do this s— on purpose,” Tatum said. “I promise you we don’t. We’re trying as hard as we can. There’s certain things we got to clean up. Obviously turnovers, movement on the offensive end. Would we have liked to have won today and be up 3-1? That would have been best-case scenario.
“But it’s the Finals. The art of competition, they came here feeling like they had to win. It wasn’t easy. I think that’s kind of the beauty of it, that it’s not going to be easy. It shouldn’t be.
“We know we both want it, and we got to go take it.”
MIAMI — Boston Celtics star Jayson Tatum has said repeatedly over the past year that he felt disrespected by being left off of last year’s All-NBA teams — a decision that cost Tatum tens of millions of dollars on his current contract.
After Tatum was selected to the All-NBA first team Tuesday evening, he said Wednesday ahead of Game 5 of the Eastern Conference finals against the Miami Heat that there should be some sort of criteria for voters to follow in making their selections.
“What’s the saying, a day late and a dollar short?” Tatum asked with a wry smile following Boston’s shootaround at FTX Arena. “Obviously, I’m thankful. First-team All-NBA, that’s a big deal. So I’m grateful for that recognition.
“It wasn’t really incentivized for me [to make it last year] with the money and all of that. It was more just I felt kind of disrespected, and I talked about this quite a bit, just on the criteria and how it’s voted is just so wide open … there’s not really set rules on who should qualify.
“I think that was the frustrating part. But it happened. Did I think I was one of the best 15 players last year? One thousand percent. But that’s behind me now, and I made it this year and now we’re trying to win a championship.”
Being left off the list last year caused Tatum to miss out on a provision in his contract that would have bumped his salary up to the next level of a max contract — 30% of the salary cap — as opposed to the 25% that typically falls under rookie extensions under a rule in the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement named after Derrick Rose.
This year, Atlanta Hawks guard Trae Young qualified for that same bump by making the All-NBA third team, while Phoenix Suns guard Devin Booker and Minnesota Timberwolves center Karl-Anthony Towns both are now eligible to sign massive four-year supermax contract extensions this summer because they made it.
While Tatum said he wasn’t sure exactly what the criteria should be for voters, he did say he thinks it should go from being by positions (guard, forward and center) to positionless, and he made his point by saying it didn’t make much sense that Philadelphia 76ers center Joel Embiid, who finished second to Denver Nuggets center Nikola Jokic in MVP voting, should be a second-team All-NBA player.
The irony is that had the league been positionless with its ballot this year, Tatum would’ve been second team and Embiid would’ve been first.
“There just should be some rules in place,” Tatum said. “I don’t know exactly, but maybe you should have to play a certain amount of games, or maybe you’re a playoff team or not.
“I think it should just be like the 15 best players. Obviously, with some guys in a contract year, supermax deals involved, that’s tough. I’m sure that’s tough on the voters as well. So I think there’s a lot that could be changed in that area, in that regard.”
After Boston disappointed last year, finishing with a .500 record in the COVID-19-shortened 2020-21 regular season, Tatum finished just out of the voting. He said the biggest reason for his inclusion this year, besides Boston playing better, was his improved playmaking.
“We won more games than last year,” he said. “But I think playmaking, just being able to read the game a lot better slowed it down for me in a lot of ways. And I think that has shown just with my playmaking ability and running the offense at times.”
This topsy-turvy, injury-riddled series between the Boston Celtics and Miami Heat has been so strange, the magnitude of tonight’s Game 5 in Miami almost sneaks up on you.
Marcus Smart, Kyle Lowry, Al Horford, Jimmy Butler, Tyler Herro, Jayson Tatum, and Robert Williams III have missed some or all of at least one game. That has robbed this series of any rhythm. Each game has been its own entity. It almost feels as if the real series hasn’t started, and yet one team tonight will give itself two chances to win one game and advance to the NBA Finals.
Every chance at this late stage is precious. Miami has already nailed one of the greatest instant rebuilds in modern sports history, chasing its second Finals in three years despite having almost zero cap flexibility or tradable assets only a half-decade ago. Its two most accomplished veterans, Butler and Kyle Lowry, are 32 and 36, respectively, and dealing with nagging leg injuries.
The Celtics are in their fourth conference finals in six seasons; they have yet to win one in this Tatum-Smart-Jaylen Brown era. The 2017 and 2018 appearances were gravy — young-ish teams exceeding expectations, and (in 2018) pushing LeBron James and the Cleveland Cavaliers to the limit.
Then, drama and near misses. Kyrie Irving and Gordon Hayward got healthy in 2019, but the juggernaut-on-paper disintegrated in the second round amid infighting and Irving’s wandering eye. The Celtics met Miami in the conference finals the next season in the bubble, losing a six-game heartbreaker that is regarded internally as a painful missed opportunity. They then fell so far as to be a first-round patsy for the Brooklyn Nets. More turmoil followed. Another loss now, and regret creeps into the fabric of this core.
Both teams are as well equipped as anyone to defend the whirring Warriors machine, presuming Golden State holds on against the Dallas Mavericks. Boston in particular has played Golden State well over the Steve Kerr/Stephen Curry era. The contender’s circle will be more crowded next season.
And though it seems the Celtics have the edge — they are plus-28 through four games, and have been the league’s best team since Jan. 1 — Miami has home-court. Funny things happen in discrete games. One or two variables flipping Miami’s way tonight — Butler’s return to form after 14 points on 6-of-22 shooting combined in Games 3 and 4, a scorcher from Herro (if healthy), random foul trouble to Tatum or Brown — and Miami could be up 3-2, with two cracks at the Finals. The Heat reminded us in Game 3 that they are tough enough, stout enough on defense, to finagle a win even with Butler out after halftime. Finagle another tonight, and all the pressure shifts to Boston.
Miami’s defense gives it a chance almost every night. The return of Lowry — switchable, unmovable on the block — fortified that defense against Boston’s mismatch-hunting. Max Strus is the only real target in Miami’s starting five, and he’s big, smart, and feisty. Miami can limit the amount of time it features two of Strus, Gabe Vincent, Duncan Robinson, and Herro. (Any Miami lineup without both P.J. Tucker and Butler makes for some nervy possessions against Tatum and Brown.)
Amid all the lineup chaos, the series may have reached one tipping point in Boston’s blowout Game 4 win: The Celtics appeared to figure out their preferred defensive coverages, and nailed the execution.
The biggest question of the series was whether the Heat could puncture the Celtics’ half-court defense. So far, they have mostly failed. Miami is scoring 90.9 points per 100 possessions in the half-court against Boston, per Cleaning The Glass — a mark that would have ranked 27th in the regular-season.
The Heat have won only when they have forced heaps of turnovers to ignite their transition game. (Miami’s ability to generate turnovers was a very predictable bellwether.) Boston has 39 turnovers in Miami’s two wins, and 18 in its own victories.
All season, Lowry has been the engine of Miami’s airborne transition game, and his return in Game 3 — his hit-aheads, and relentless devotion to pace for the sake of pace — seemed to catch Boston off-guard.
The half-court is a different story.
Four games in, the Celtics have decided to drop back on almost every two-man action involving Tucker and Bam Adebayo as screeners. That keeps Boston’s biggest defenders and rebounders near the glass. The goal is to stay in front of the ball, barricade the paint, stick to outside shooters, and force floaters and long 2s. (Almost half Miami’s attempts in Game 4 were midrangers, a gigantic share.)
In earlier games, Adebayo had been beating some Boston switches with hard slips to the rim; the Celtics seemed determined to correct that in Game 4, even at the risk of opening up other shots:
Boston’s dropback scheme relies on guards skittering around picks without falling too far behind Miami’s ball handlers. Any delay has a cascading effect: That ball handler has more daylight, the Celtic defending the screener has to step further up and over to contain him, and suddenly Adebayo is dunking you into oblivion — or sucking in help that exposes open 3s.
Every inch matters. Even an extra foot of runway can be the difference between Adebayo lofting a 14-foot floater and rampaging into a closer-range shot:
Miami needs to unlock Adebayo again, and Adebayo needs to force the issue. Adebayo had 31 points in Game 3; he has 25 combined in the other three games. There has to be an in-between.
The Celtics were airtight getting around screens in Game 4. Just in case, their big guys ventured out an extra step on actions involving Strus. But even the best drop-heavy defenses yield a few open pull-up jumpers. The Heat missed them in Game 4. To win this game, and this series — and maybe to jolt Boston out of this scheme — they need to make some shots like this:
Those are tough shots. It’s a lot to ask to make a bunch of them. The NBA at this stage demands a lot.
Notice Payton Pritchard is the target on both those plays. The Heat did not go at Pritchard or Derrick White enough in Game 4. (White is a very good defender, but Butler and Adebayo can bully him.) That probably had a lot to do with Herro’s absence and Butler looking a shell of himself, but they need to peck at Boston’s rare vulnerabilities. (One favorite: having whoever White or Pritchard is guarding set an off-ball back pick for Butler — designed to get him a favorable switch as he burrows into post-up position.)
Miami will push at every chance, but it’ll need to get more creative with counters in the half-court. Vanilla high pick-and-rolls won’t get it done.
It was not a coincidence Miami opened the second half of Game 4 with this gem — a pick-and-roll that morphs into a pindown for Strus:
Plays like that turn drop-back schemes against themselves. The initial pick-and-roll is a decoy to get the defense retreating so no one is in position to jump out on Strus.
Screen-the-screener actions — in which a third Miami player nails Adebayo’s defender as Adebayo is on the way up for a pick-and-roll — have the same effect of knocking the defense behind the play. The Heat can mix in pick-and-rolls with Adebayo as the ball handler, and try to surprise Boston with screens at half court — opening a long runway — or low picks around the foul line. Flipping the angle of picks at the last second might fool Boston here and there.
Miami might use Butler more as a screener if the Celtics slot Williams III on him again — mimicking a gambit the Philadelphia 76ers tried with Joel Embiid. (Boston has been going under more ball screens for Butler since Game 1, and that tactic has worked.) It could shift more offense away from the pick-and-roll, leaning into Adebayo’s post game — using him as trigger man for Miami’s complex off-ball actions.
Shifting rapid-fire from one side to the other is always a handy method of baiting the defense — and then attacking elsewhere. Miami tried more of that when Game 4 was out of hand:
The Heat can pry open some quick-hitting post-ups for Adebayo with similar actions, including cross screens under the basket. Miami is an ultra-high-IQ, resourceful team. The Heat make magic in tight spaces. They need all the ingenuity they can muster now.
Boston is selectively switching many of Miami’s other actions, sometimes as part of the plan and sometimes as improvisation. The Celtics are built to switch any Lowry-Butler actions. They are expert at double-switches — at rescuing smaller guys from the post before the offense can enter the ball.
Miami can beat some of those switches with the usual tricks: hard slips, rejecting ball screens and jetting away from them, and general high-speed creativity.
Miami is a little more adept at that stuff than Boston. The Celtics have been perhaps their most effective this postseason searching out mismatches for Tatum and Brown. That can lead to shots for Boston’s stars, or drive-and-kick sequences when Boston’s offense sings.
The snazziest of those from Game 4 started with a double screen for Tatum from White (defended by Lowry) and Williams III (defended by Strus.) Lowry diagnosed the play early and ordered Strus to toggle onto Tatum’s first screener — White. Lowry wanted to be last in the chain, so he could switch onto Tatum.
But Tatum out-thought Lowry, which is hard to do. Tatum saw that first switch, leaving Strus on White, and waved Williams III away. Tatum wanted Strus alone.
Tatum got the switch. Adebayo crept from Horford in the corner to show help. Tatum whipped the ball to Horford. Horford blew by Adebayo’s close-out, and lofted an alley-oop for Williams III. Boom.
Williams III’s availability is a major swing factor. If Daniel Theis is in that spot, Horford can’t flick the lob; he has to thread some interior pass, giving Miami’s defense time to recover. If Williams III can’t go, the Celtics should start the Grant Williams-Horford duo, and go smaller — with Tatum or Brown at power forward — before going to Theis. (That is more complicated if Smart is out. Ugh, this series.) Boston for the playoffs is plus-34 in 71 minutes with Horford surrounded by four wings and guards.
(On the flip side, the Dewayne Dedmon minutes continue to be a problem for Miami; the Heat are minus-19 in 38 minutes with Dedmon on the floor in this series. They can’t play Adebayo 48 minutes. The best remaining option is the Tuckwagon look, with Tucker as small-ball center, but Tucker is banged up and that lineup hasn’t worked all that well in limited minutes against Boston. It seems far-fetched to dust off Markieff Morris or Omer Yurtseven.)
Boston was more calculated preying on Miami’s weaker links in Game 4. It did not waste possessions, or time within possessions. Tatum is at his best when he goes full speed at those matchups as the switch is happening instead of pulling the ball out to dance:
Tatum meandered a bit in Game 3, sometimes giving the ball up before doing anything against his preferred matchups:
He dialed up the decisiveness in Game 4. That head-down driving is one factor in Boston’s enormous plus-39 edge in free throw attempts. The Heat cannot survive that. Boston has gotten a bit of a friendly whistle, but the Heat foul a lot; they were 27th in opponent free throw rate in the regular season. If Butler can’t pressure the rim — and he couldn’t in Games 3 and 4 — the Heat have a hard time generating free throws.
Miami can probably do better getting under any Tatum ball screens for Smart, but that’s easier said than done.
Brown has looked comfortable going at Strus one-on-one:
(Those sideline pindowns for Brown and Tatum — with all three other Celtics on the opposite side, complicating help assignments — are a Boston staple.)
All of these actions have something in common: They avoid Adebayo. He can shut off Boston’s pick-and-roll attack with switches. The Celtics don’t have to avoid him altogether. The smart move is to entice him into a switch early in the shot clock, removing Miami’s only rim protector from the basket area, and then attack elsewhere.
Miami could try more zone, but that hasn’t bothered Boston; the Celtics have scored a blazing 1.36 points per possession in 26 trips against Miami’s once-feared zone, per Second Spectrum. This isn’t the Miami zone of 2020, with two of Butler, Jae Crowder, and Derrick Jones Jr. eating up space at the top. That zone was an asset. This one is at least somewhat an expression of vulnerability — something to protect lesser defenders.
These might be the two best defenses in the league. This series will be won in the muck. Both teams are at home there. Game 4 might have been a turning point — a statement win in which Boston found the right formula on defense. We’ll see. This series has been full of twists. Let’s see the Heat’s response at home.
The Milwaukee Bucks were exceptionally well prepared for the Boston Celtics in a stifling Game 1 win that warped the terrain of the series.
They appeared to anticipate Boston slotting its center (Robert Williams III) onto Wesley Matthews, a potential alignment I mentioned in my preview — but one I did not expect Boston to use right away. On the Bucks’ second possession, they had Matthews screen for Jrue Holiday — testing how the Celtics wanted Williams handling pick-and-rolls, and whether he could stay in front of Holiday on a switch.
Holiday roasted him, drew help, and flicked the ball to Giannis Antetokounmpo for a hammer dunk.
On defense, the Bucks slotted Holiday onto Marcus Smart and Matthews on Jayson Tatum — allowing them to switch the Smart-Tatum two-man game. That meant Antetokounmpo would defend Jaylen Brown, and Milwaukee in past matchups preferred to keep Antetokounmpo away from Brown and Tatum — to spare him some energy, and have him on the back line.
Antetokounmpo embraced the new assignment. This series could end up the greatest testament so far to the subtle, gradual improvements Antetokounmpo has made at the edges. Even a season ago, he could not have dominated a high-stakes playoff game to the same degree — could not have been easily the best player — while shooting 9-of-25 and making only six free throws.
When the Bucks downsized midway through the first quarter — with Bobby Portis resting — they rejiggered matchups so that Grayson Allen was on Smart. Boston went immediately to the Smart-Tatum pick-and-roll, hoping to get Allen switched onto Tatum. It even had Tatum sprint out of the pick without really setting it — hoping to surprise the Bucks.
It failed. The Bucks read the play, and stayed home.
Milwaukee’s focus, size, and physicality seemed to unnerve Boston after a week against the smaller Brooklyn Nets. Even Brown and Tatum — 10-of-31 combined in Game 1, with as many total turnovers (10) as free throw attempts — appeared skittish upon arriving in the lane and seeing very large humans awaiting them.
The Celtics can rationalize some optimism for Game 2. Brown and Tatum cannot play much worse. The Bucks won Game 1 by scoring off Boston’s 18 turnovers, and a decent chunk of those were sloppy and borderline unforced. The Celtics hit 36% on 3s — about league average. They’d love to be better considering Milwaukee is leaving everyone but Brown, Tatum, and Payton Pritchard wide open, but 36% should be good enough if the Celtics clean up other areas. (Derrick White passing up open 3s is becoming a major concern. If Smart is limited in Game 2 — or can’t go at all — Boston needs more from White and Pritchard.)
Boston’s shot distribution is more alarming: 50 3s, and 34 2s. Even the peak Daryl Morey Houston Rockets are concerned.
One reason I picked Boston in six (aside from Khris Middleton’s injury) was that the Celtics’ shot selection aligns with what Milwaukee concedes. The Bucks barricade the rim; the Celtics don’t get there much, preferring 3s and midrangers. The underlying assumption was that Boston could mimic its average shot selection against Milwaukee.
That was wrong. Even a jumper-heavy offense takes about 30% of its shots from the restricted area, and makes two-thirds of them. Those points are baked into the jump-shooting equation. Without them, the math breaks. Game 1 was an example of what can befall even proficient jump-shooting teams when easy 2s are extinguished.
It didn’t feel like it, but Boston got about its normal share of shots at the basket. It just couldn’t finish; Boston hit 45% in the restricted area. Most of that was sound Milwaukee defense. Boston underperformed its expected effective field-goal percentage by the largest margin among all teams who just wrapped Game 1s, per Second Spectrum, but that tracking data may be underrating the influence of Milwaukee’s defense.
The Celtics’ midrange shots vanished. About 30% of their shots in the regular season came from the midrange. That dropped to 17% in Game 1, and almost all of them were contested floaters. They generated almost zero clean long 2s.
The Bucks were awesome chasing Boston’s best players over screens. When Tatum, Brown and Smart turned the corner, they felt defenders behind them — ready to blanket any jumper. When they hit the paint, they saw help defenders blockading the basket. Look how far Antetokounmpo is from his assignment — Grant Williams, in the right corner — when Tatum comes off a pindown from Horford:
Boston’s stars see the floor arranged this way and register three choices: floater, kickout, or take it all the way. Stars have an earned bravado. They are not afraid of Lopez or Portis. They might fear Antetokounmpo, but stars outduel other stars all the time. When they see the basket within reach, they go for it.
Some of Boston’s attempts at the rim in Game 1 were blocked. Some were wild under duress, and missed by a lot. On maybe a half-dozen such shots, the Celtics would have been better off kicking to an open shooter — and not necessarily for that guy to shoot.
Those players can take those kickout passes, drive into space, and keep the machine moving. Make one or two more passes, and the Celtics might create another shot at the rim — this time with the defense scrambling, and Milwaukee’s best rim protectors perhaps elsewhere. They might draw fouls, or pry open a clean midranger. It’s not about shooting less often at the rim. It’s about producing better looks there. (And in a few cases, wide-open corner 3s would have been better than harried, flailing shots at the basket.)
That requires starting their first action early in the shot clock, and playing with pace in the half court.
Some other things to watch in Game 2:
• The other mismatch-y thing Boston will probe is Lopez’s pick-and-roll defense. Lopez prefers hanging in the paint, but he ventured to the arc against Tatum. That seemed to surprise Tatum.
Boston should continue to prod. Lopez may revert to dropback defense at some point, exposing open pull-ups — assuming Boston’s screen-setters hit people. And if Lopez keeps creeping outside, Tatum will be prepared. He can try to jet around Lopez; cross him over inside; or jab step to get him backpedaling — before jacking an open 3. (He nailed one triple this way in Game 1.)
• Boston also smashed Lopez with a few screen-the-screener actions — pick-and-rolls on which a third Celtic (Tatum below) drills Lopez while Lopez’s man is on the way up to set a ball screen:
That delays Lopez, and messes up his footwork — allowing Boston’s ball handlers to rev up at him. They have a better chance at finishing over and around Lopez — or just drawing extra help — by going at him with a head of steam.
• Those sideline pindowns for Brown and Tatum also target Lopez. Those sets clear one side of the floor for Brown and Tatum, and give them the ball at full speed with a runway. Boston should run even more of those.
• Boston shouldn’t be afraid to use Antetokounmpo’s man as the screener when he’s guarding either Horford or Robert Williams. Engaging him on the ball is almost better than having him lurking around the rim. Make him work.
• That goes double when Antetokounmpo is on Brown — the matchup Milwaukee preferred with all three of Antetokounmpo, Portis, and Lopez on the floor. The Celtics had some success springing Brown with flare screens on Antetokounmpo. They might shift Brown a little more pick-and-roll duty, forcing Antetokounmpo to defend like a guard:
You don’t want to slide too much offense away from Tatum — Brown is better as a secondary attacker — but Boston has room to try. The Celtics might tire Antetokounmpo (if that’s possible), or lure him into silly fouls.
• It will be interesting to monitor Milwaukee’s frontcourt minutes distribution. The Antetokounmpo-Portis-Lopez trio has been a nice stopgap in Middleton’s absence, but this may become a series in which Milwaukee is more itself with two of those three on the floor. In those lineups, Antetokounmpo toggles off Brown and onto one of Boston’s bigs — an easier assignment, and one that better leverages his rim protection.
In Game 1, Milwaukee was minus-3 in 11 minutes with that big trio. It was plus-2 in eight minutes when Lopez and Antetokounmpo played without Portis, and a whopping plus-24 in 18 minutes with the Antetokounmpo/Portis pairing — and no Lopez.
• Boston might peck at Portis in the pick-and-roll more. He’s blitzing, and if Boston is prepared, it should be able to get 4-on-3s whenever it wants: have Portis’s man screen for Tatum or Brown, bait the blitz, and hit that screener slipping free to the foul line Draymond Green-style. Tatum can also try to split some Portis traps.
The Bucks could counter by switching matchups or softening Portis’s approach, but Boston has counters for all that.
• When Matthews is on Tatum, can Boston simplify some and let Tatum go one-on-one now and then — without bringing a screener into things? Tatum should be able to scoot by Matthews. It might not be something you want to bank on for 15 or 25 possessions, but it’s worth exploring.
• The Portis-Brown cross-match is an intriguing little bellwether. Boston has Brown guarding Portis when the starters are on the floor, but Milwaukee wants Portis defending Horford. Brown broke free in the open court a few times as Milwaukee searched out their favored matchups, but Brown could not finish those plays. On the flip side, Portis got Brown on a couple of post-ups.
• I wonder if Boston might rearrange matchups so Robert Williams is on Lopez instead of Matthews. Robert Williams also managed about as well as could be expected switching onto Antetokounmpo.
• I’m not really sure why Daniel Theis played in Game 1.
• Milwaukee is well built to switch Brown-Tatum actions. Even so, Boston left some meat on the bone there. Having those guys screen for each other might get Allen, Pat Connaughton, or Jevon Carter switched onto Tatum. When the starters are on the floor, those actions might even get Antetokounmpo switched onto Tatum.
Boston could then pivot right into Tatum pick-and-rolls — shoving Antetokounmpo out of his comfort zone. The Celtics went away from that matchup the few times they got it in Game 1:
Give me a Tatum-Robert Williams pick-and-roll here over Brown isolating against Holiday.
• For their part, the Bucks probably let Pritchard and White off the hook too easily. I loved this nugget from Game 1:
That’s Holiday — with White on him — getting a pair of screens from Antetokounmpo and Allen (defended by Tatum.) There’s a good chance that play ends with White or Tatum on Antetokounmpo. (Tatum is a great defender, but Boston has avoided having him guard Antetokounmpo.)
• Boston probably over-helped on Antetokounmpo isolations and post-ups — particularly on the wings.
Once Antetokounmpo picks up his dribble and turns baseline, there is no reason for Smart to double from one pass away. You’re much more likely to give up an easy 3 than to snag a steal.
Grant Williams has good intentions here; he drifts off Portis, both to help on Antetokounmpo and be around in case the second layer of help leaves a cutter open (as almost happens with Connaughton flashing into the paint.)
But he’s kind of in no man’s land, helping without really interfering.
This is easy to say from a bird’s eye view. This is Giannis freaking Antetokounmpo — the league’s premiere rim-attacking force. In a vacuum, you look at those clips and conclude: Just let him shoot a fadeaway or a floater. I mean, sure. But if you don’t show help — if you don’t at least make Antetokounmpo think — a lot of these possessions are going to end with him bulldozing someone into the basket.
And even if the Celtics did make some mistakes in over-helping — and they did — well, this is what superstars do: stress you out, sow panic, cloud your decision-making.
Also working against Boston: how far Antetokounmpo has come as a passer, including out of double-teams. Two seasons ago and maybe even last year, you might have coaxed throwaway turnovers from him — or at least gotten him to settle for reactive, non-threatening passes.
Now, he’s manipulating defenses — slinging cross-court lasers when the defense is still rotating toward him, using lookaways to trick defenders into lurching the wrong way.
That mindset has trickled across the entire Milwaukee roster. At full throttle, the Bucks have become an exquisite passing team. Their best sequences are remarkable considering how out of sorts and unfocused they looked frittering away possessions early in that classic second-round series against the Nets last season. Even score-first types like Portis are touching the ball around the floor once the Bucks have defenses rotating.
Milwaukee still suffers bouts of haziness — possessions on which the ball stalls out, Antetokounmpo settles for long jumpers, or someone ignores a glaring mismatch. Boston is good enough to bring out those bad habits.
But the Bucks played Game 1 like a confident, polished champion. Boston has dominated the league over the last 50 games, but it will need to dig deeper to win this series — starting in Game 2.
The Milwaukee Bucks held most of the cards going into the last day of the regular season.
They were in the East’s No. 2 slot, one game ahead of the Boston Celtics, but knew Boston held the tiebreaker. The Bucks saw the Brooklyn Nets lurking as a potentially dangerous No. 7 seed.
The Bucks effectively conceded their final game against the Cleveland Cavaliers, sitting all their key regulars save for Jrue Holiday — who played eight seconds before committing an intentional foul so he could log his 67th game, and trigger a $306,000 bonus. By doing so, Milwaukee foisted an unpleasant choice onto the Celtics: If Boston beat Memphis in its finale, it would leapfrog Milwaukee into the No. 2 spot — risking that matchup against Brooklyn. Lose to the Grizzlies (who had nothing to play for, and rested all five starters), and the Celtics — assuming a Philadelphia 76ers win over the Detroit Pistons — would fall to No. 4. That meant a series against the Toronto Raptors, amid rumblings at least one key Boston player was not fully vaccinated — and thus ineligible to play in Toronto.
Boston won, and got that No. 2 seed — and a date with the Nets. The Bucks avoided Brooklyn, but their gambit cost them home-court advantage in this mega-series. For the second consecutive postseason, it’s possible Milwaukee is playing the “real” NBA Finals in the second round — only this time without Khris Middleton for at least the first part of the series as he recovers from a leg injury. (I’m less convinced of the “real NBA Finals” framing this time around, given how great the Phoenix Suns have been when healthy and the Golden State Warriors now rampaging at full throttle.)
Boston has been by far the league’s best team since Jan. 1. It is 38-12 in that span, and has outscored opponents by about 12.5 points per 100 possessions. Anything over double digits suggests historic dominance. The No. 2 team in that stretch — Phoenix — was plus-8 per 100 possessions. For the season, the Bucks are plus-3.2.
Jayson Tatum was the best player (by a lot) in a series featuring Kevin Durant. If he’s the best player in this series, Milwaukee is in trouble. With Middleton out, the Bucks need Giannis Antetokounmpo at his peak to beat Boston four times in seven tries — with a potential Game 7 on the road. They need him to be the best player by a comfortable margin. Antetokounmpo is obviously capable, even against a Boston team that has more options defending him than any other opponent. He is the league’s most destructive two-way player — a two-time MVP and reigning Finals MVP who appears to have overcome his free throw issues and can toggle between all three front-court positions.
If there is a player who can solve Boston’s impenetrable, ultra-switchy defense, it is Antetokounmpo.
That defense has gotten most of the attention during Boston’s rise, but the Celtics also have the league’s No. 2 offense over those 50 games. It is well built to prod Milwaukee’s stout defense. The Bucks prioritize limiting shots at the rim and free throws; the Celtics don’t depend much on either. They were 22nd in both free throw rate and percentage of attempts in the restricted area, per Cleaning The Glass.
Boston takes a good amount of long 2s and lots of 3s — a prerequisite for having any chance against Milwaukee. Only the Miami Heat allowed more 3-point attempts than Milwaukee. The Bucks live with a certain number of semi-contested (and sometimes uncontested) above-the-break 3s. It is the cost they pay to barricade the paint. To upend them — to turn math against them — you have to make a solid number of those 3s. You won’t outduel the Bucks at the rim, and you almost certainly won’t make enough long 2s to warp the math in your favor. (This is why the 3-phobic Chicago Bulls were drawing dead against Milwaukee in the first round.)
Boston is not a great long-range shooting team. It starts one total non-shooter (Robert Williams III, assuming he returns to the starting lineup) and two so-so shooters — Marcus Smart and Al Horford, both around 33% from deep — around Tatum and Jaylen Brown. Derrick White has struggled on 3s. Grant Williams has been a revelation from deep this season, but the Bucks are likely eager to see how real that is. (It looks real from here.)
Expect the Bucks to dare Horford, Smart, White, and even Grant Williams to launch — to sometimes leave them open, close out only halfway, maybe get in their heads if they miss a couple in a row. On the flip side, if those guys hit enough open 3s, the Celtics should be in good shape — and the Bucks might have to adjust.
The Celtics have preferred to play big, with two of Williams, Williams III, and Horford on the floor at almost all times. They have rarely had to downsize, shifting Brown or Tatum to power forward as a means of boosting their shooting. Playing big has fortified Boston’s defense and rebounding. It will be interesting to see if Milwaukee can nudge them into smaller lineups at all, and if it would even matter. (It seemed for a bit after the White trade that Boston’s closing five would be Smart, White, Brown, Tatum, and Williams III, but we have not seen much of that group. Horford and Williams have been too good.)
Boston compensates for so-so shooting with side-to-side action, expert shotmaking from its stars, and copious mismatch hunting — with the goal of getting a smaller guard switched onto Tatum. In the regular-season, Tatum participated in pick-and-rolls (as either screener or ball handler) with Smart and Brown about 11.5 times combined per 100 possessions, per Second Spectrum. That skyrocketed to about 25 such pick-and-rolls per 100 possessions in the first round against Brooklyn; the Nets offered Tatum his pick among several undersized guards. (Boston is also using the Tatum-White and Tatum-Payton Pritchard combos more.)
Tatum and Brown cooperated in more off-ball screening actions when Brooklyn stashed a smaller guard on Brown.
The Tatum-Smart two-man game has been the star of the show. In the regular season, Boston averaged 1.4 points per possession on trips featuring any Smart ball screen for Tatum — No. 1 among all combinations with at least 100 reps, per Second Spectrum. The inverse — Tatum screening for Smart — has become perhaps Boston’s go-to play, and it posted even fatter numbers against Brooklyn.
In theory, defenses should duck under Tatum’s picks for Smart — inviting Smart to launch, and avoiding any fatal switch. The Bucks will be better about that than Brooklyn was. But Tatum has made that harder by rolling right into Smart’s man, and dragging that guy into the paint — forcing the switch:
This sort of mismatch chasing should not work as well against the Bucks. They are bigger than the Nets. They don’t play a traditional point guard. But Tatum has had no issues going at Grayson Allen, Pat Connaughton, and George Hill (if he plays.) Jevon Carter defends above his size, but he’s no match for Tatum. Even Wesley Matthews is at a disadvantage in speed, agility, and size.
Tatum can also attack Lopez in standard pick-and-rolls, and rain jumpers if Lopez sags back too far.
And with Middleton out, the matchup cat-and-mouse game gets trickier for the Bucks; they are down a wing defender. The Bucks have been starting a bigger lineup of Matthews, Holiday, Antetokounmpo, Bobby Portis, and Brook Lopez. They have surely discussed tweaking that ahead of this series, but the safer bet is Mike Budenholzer sticking at first with what worked against Chicago.
Matthews and Holiday have split the Tatum assignment in the past. It would be ideal to have another switchable defender on Smart — to switch the Tatum-Smart dance — but that is tougher to manage with this big lineup. If Holiday and Matthews are on Smart and Tatum, that means Antetokounmpo has to guard Brown. The Bucks have mostly kept Antetokounmpo away from Brown and Tatum, so that he can rove as a help defender. (He’s better at that than at navigating screens against slippery wings.)
Against the Bulls, Milwaukee had Antetokounmpo defend Chicago’s so-so shooting point guards — Alex Caruso, and then Ayo Dosunmu. They may mimic that against Boston, and open with Antetokounmpo on Smart — allowing Holiday and Matthews to defend Tatum and Brown. I’d wager that’s how Milwaukee begins things: Antetokounmpo on Smart; Portis on Horford; Lopez on Williams III; and Holiday and Matthews flip-flopping between Boston’s All-Stars.
In that alignment, Antetokounmpo will mix things up against the Tatum-Smart two-man game. Sometimes, he’ll duck Tatum’s picks for Smart. Sometimes, he’ll switch. When Tatum is the ball handler, Antetokounmpo might drop back like a traditional center. Without Middleton, Antetokounmpo will have to guard Tatum and Brown at least a bit — either on switches, or now and then as his primary assignment — for Milwaukee to win. (Holiday will also guard Smart here and there.)
Regardless: Whenever Antetokounmpo is on one of Smart, Brown, or Tatum, expect Boston to run him through a gauntlet of screens and cuts.
Of course, we will see Antetokounmpo as part of lineups big, small, and medium sized. Heck, the Bucks could swap Allen (playing so well right now!) in for Portis in the starting five — creating a more traditional two-big lineup in which Antetokounmpo would defend Horford.
The Bucks will use the Antetokounmpo-Portis duo when Lopez rests, and smaller lineups featuring four guards and Antetokounmpo at center. In both those constructions, Antetokounmpo might defend the opposing center (Williams III or Horford) to keep him near the rim.
(Pay close attention to the minutes Antetokounmpo rests. Boston has to win those. At full health, the Bucks would have both Middleton and Holiday on the floor in those stints — and at least two of their big three on the floor at all times. Now they have to survive stretches with only one, and those non-Antetokounmpo minutes can be fraught on offense. They feature lots of Holiday-Lopez pick-and-rolls.)
Lopez is a decent shooter, but not a great one. He typically checks in around 35% on 3s, with a slowish release. (Beware his languid pump-and-drive game, though! It’s sneakily effective.) Boston’s defense took off when coach Ime Udoka made the unconventional choice of stashing Williams III on corner shooters, allowing him to roam the baseline as a shot-blocker.
Lopez often serves as a supersized spot-up threat, sometimes from the corners. Boston could keep things simple, and start Williams III on Lopez, allowing them to play around with Horford’s assignment. Williams III is fast enough to drift from Lopez, ready to pounce in the paint, and still recover to run him off the arc.
Lineups without Lopez — with Portis and Antetokounmpo together, or Antetokounmpo as the only big — bump up Milwaukee’s overall shooting. Milwaukee may need to maximize its shooting to win this series, even if it means cutting into Lopez’s minutes slightly.
The Celtics’ top seven is gigantic. They are long and smart, the league’s best help-and-recover team. They can shade toward Antetokounmpo without conceding wide-open 3s anywhere else. Give them one below-average shooter to stray from, and that makes the job even easier — Antetokounmpo’s path more crowded.
How the Celtics guard Antetokounmpo is the series’ most interesting subplot. They are one of the league’s stingiest transition defense teams — diligent in getting back, well equipped to build the proverbial wall. One benefit of being huge and switchable is not worrying about matchups in transition. Just pick up whoever is closest, and go from there. (Boston was No. 2 — behind only Golden State — in fewest shots allowed at the basket, per Cleaning The Glass. At their best, the Bucks bludgeon the rim.)
Very quietly, Milwaukee’s half-court offense has become much more reliable than two seasons ago and even during the first three rounds of their title run last season. Even so, the first step to beating them is to defang their fast-break attack.
Brown and Horford have taken the bulk of the Antetokounmpo assignment this season and in the past, but Boston will switch a ton and give Smart, Williams, and maybe even Williams III some reps. (Boston has kept Tatum away from Antetokounmpo.)
I’d bet (slightly) on Boston opening with Horford on Antetokounmpo; Brown on Portis; Williams III on Lopez; and Smart and Tatum flipping between Matthews and Holiday. (They could also start Brown on Antetokounmpo, with Horford on Portis.) Everything will be fluid. They are going to show Antetokounmpo a ton of looks, to try to surprise him and keep him off balance.
Antetokounmpo has become Milwaukee’s screen-setting hub. When Horford is on him, Boston might switch or have Horford retreat in a more conventional defense. Horford was once one of the league’s closest things to an Antetokounmpo stopper, but Antetokounmpo solved Horford’s one-on-one defense when Milwaukee obliterated Boston in this same round in 2019. Horford has a better shot defending Antetokounmpo in traditional pick-and-rolls.
Antetokounmpo is too quick for Horford one-on-one. He can (at times) overpower Boston’s guards and wings on switches. If Antetokounmpo catches at the edge of the paint, he can bulldoze even Smart or Brown:
Boston will show help, send double-teams, front the post, and swarm from behind. Antetokounmpo made huge strides this season as passer, whipping the ball out of double-teams early — with the defense still rotating toward him. The Bucks are cagey at cutting during those double-teams, including sneaking along the baseline:
(Yes, that is DeMarcus Cousins, Jabari Parker, and Romeo Langford participating in a Celtics-Bucks game in the current NBA season. The cast of characters who appeared across their four matchups is truly remarkable: Cousins, Parker, Langford, Rodney Hood, Juancho Hernangomez, Jabari Parker, Luke Kornet, Sam Hauser, Javonte Smart, and others.)
But almost every Boston player is stout enough to at least make Antetokounmpo work and suck up time on the shot clock. Against Chicago, Antetokounmpo jogged into easy mismatches; one downstream effect of having Antetokounmpo defend Caruso, Dosunmu, and Nikola Vucevic is that those guys were often stuck on him after Milwaukee stops. Minus the occasional White or Pritchard mismatch, there is no such easy prey on Boston.
The other mystery is how Boston deploys Williams III when Lopez rests — and when both Lopez and Portis sit, leaving Antetokounmpo as the lone big man. Will he ever guard Antetokounmpo one-on-one? Boston has resisted that, preferring Williams III loom as the last line of defense.
But Portis is a better shooter than Lopez. Sloughing too far from him is dangerous, even for someone as fast and hoppy as the Time Lord. On the other hand, having Williams III stick to an outside shooter is a waste of his rim protection.
Would he guard a more stationary wing — Connaughton, Matthews, or Carter? Maybe. (He could even start games on Matthews, since Boston would be fine slotting Tatum onto Portis — leaving Horford on Lopez and Brown on Antetokounmpo. I doubt Boston would go that route — it amounts to getting too cute — but that it’s not outlandish indicates how much flexibility Boston has.)
But I’d like to see Boston try Williams III on Antetokounmpo — just to see how Antetokounmpo handles his length and leaping ability.
Antetokounmpo with shooting and defense around him is enough to make this a competitive series — even without Middleton, his go-to pick-and-roll partner. If Antetokounmpo is a legit 70% or 75% free throw shooter now — his foul shooting has dropped off in past playoffs — there’s no real way to stop him from getting 30 points and eating around the basket. The only hope is to limit his efficiency some, hope the other Bucks don’t get hot from 3, and score pretty well on the other end.
Boston has the ingredients to check all those boxes. Even with Middleton available from the jump, I’d lean to Boston in a long series. Without him, it’s Boston in six.
You heard the question as rivals eyed the standings and maybe even jockeyed to avoid them:
Why is everyone so afraid of the Brooklyn Nets?
Well, that’s why: Even when perhaps the world’s best player shoots 9-of-24 — even amid a season in which it has been impossible for them to develop any momentum — they take the No. 2 seed to the wire in Game 1 of what could be a riveting first-round series.
All it took was one of their two (available) stars compensating for the shooting struggles of the other, plus good games from two role players — Nic Claxton and Goran Dragic.
It felt like Game 5 of a late-round series. These teams know each other. They attacked in the ways you expected. The coaches did not leave much low-hanging adjustment fruit.
The end result was a gut punch for the Nets. The Boston Celtics are the more complete team. They went 33-10 in their last 43 games, mauling opponents by 13.5 points per 100 possessions — almost double the margin of the No. 2 team (the Phoenix Suns, an NBA metronome) in that span. Their rotation has been consistent for months.
You need similar cohesion to beat a team this good four times in seven tries. The Nets have enjoyed cohesion for zero seconds. Steve Nash is still stitching lineups — choosing between undersized three-guard groups heavy on shooting, and stouter defensive units featuring two non-shooters Boston’s vice-grip defense can ignore. Every choice is fraught.
Joe Harris’s absence has loomed over this entire season; he might be the best shooter among Brooklyn’s perimeter role players, and better than all but Bruce Brown on defense. The potential presence of Ben Simmons looms over this series. The Nets are hopeful he might return, maybe soon, and he might unlock the center-less lineups that probably represent the team’s highest ceiling.
All those uncertainties are why snaring Game 1 seemed urgent for the Nets once they took the lead. Their margin for error is a little smaller. Simmons would widen it some.
My best guess would be Brooklyn brings Simmons off the bench, at least at first, if he returns. The team has finally settled on a starting five in Kyrie Irving, Seth Curry, Bruce Brown, Kevin Durant, and Andre Drummond. I would be mildly surprised if the Nets upended it to accommodate a unique (to be polite) player who has not played in 10 months.
Even a limited Simmons would help the Nets get out in transition, and fortify them on defense and on the glass. (Boston’s overall size helps in ways that might be tough to notice in transition defense. They don’t have to worry about finding specific matchups; they each can take whichever opposing player is nearest. The Nets don’t run a ton, but they are efficient when they do.)
Boston smoked the Nets on the glass in Game 1. That was baked into the series. Boston ranked 11th in offensive rebounding rate, the Nets dead last in defensive rebounding. It will only get worse if Robert Williams III returns. That said, Brooklyn can be more diligent gang rebounding.
Daniel Theis, normally not much of a threat, plucked four offensive boards in Game 1. The Nets went the unconventional route of guarding him with Curry — a gambit that allowed them to put their two best defenders, Durant and Bruce Brown, on Tatum and Jaylen Brown. (Irving guarded Marcus Smart, with Drummond on the resurgent Al Horford — who logged a shocking 41 minutes! That seems unsustainable, even without back-to-backs.)
The Celtics could and should have gone at that matchup more by using Theis as a screener for Brown and Tatum — forcing the Nets to choose between getting themselves into rotation, or switching Curry onto one of Boston’s stars.
I wonder if Boston will even get that chance now. Brooklyn could rejigger matchups to eliminate the Curry-Theis weirdness. It could shift Curry onto Smart; Irving to Jaylen Brown; Bruce Brown onto Tatum; Durant onto Horford; and Drummond to Theis. That would end Theis’ volleyball game on the glass and spare Durant the burden of guarding Tatum — at the cost of slotting a smaller guard onto Jaylen Brown.
When it has nothing better going — and when Tatum rests — Boston might try posting up Jaylen Brown and even Grant Williams when the Nets hide smaller players on them. Both can playmake if the Nets send help. Jaylen Brown brutalized Bruce Brown on one post-up. Anytime Jaylen Brown or Tatum ends a Boston defensive possession on one of Brooklyn’s undersized guards, they should sprint the floor and cement that matchup.
Tatum played 45 minutes in Game 1, including the entire second half. Boston barely outscored opponents in the regular season when Jaylen Brown played without Tatum. The Nets have to win those minutes. The Celtics have to win the non-Durant minutes — which they failed at in Game 1, even though Tatum played every second Durant rested. Expect the Celtics to focus more on those minutes in Game 2 — to throw more help at Irving, and perhaps make sure Theis and maybe Payton Pritchard are on the bench.
(By the way: How many players are better than Tatum right now? There is Giannis Antetokounmpo, Durant, Joel Embiid, Nikola Jokic, and probably Luka Doncic. Is that the whole list? Your mileage may vary on how to rank Stephen Curry and LeBron James. Tatum was probably better than both this season — it’s close — but those guys are legends. No one wants any part of James in one game. Curry is on the outer edges of his prime, powering an offense unlike any other in stylistic terms. But Tatum has surpassed James Harden, Jimmy Butler, Damian Lillard, Anthony Davis, and Paul George. He’s above the best young guys, including Ja Morant, Karl-Anthony Towns, Devin Booker, Trae Young, and Donovan Mitchell. His companion in terms of overall rank might be healthy Kawhi Leonard.
This is Tatum’s series. He’s guarding Durant and serving as Boston’s No. 1 option on offense. That is what apex superstars do. He blocked Irving and Durant on jump shots in Game 1. Durant’s own guy swatting his jumper is unheard of. Danny Ainge took flak for some missed draft picks and an alleged tendency to hoard assets. Some of that was justified, much of it not. But the former Celtics president of basketball operations and his staff probably haven’t gotten enough credit for trading down to select Tatum — and getting another lottery pick in the process. That is an all-time masterstroke. Imagine if the Celtics had taken Markelle Fultz or even Lonzo Ball?)
Boston did well getting Tatum matched against Brooklyn’s small guards. The Tatum-Marcus Smart pick-and-roll — with Tatum as ball handler — might be Boston’s defining play of the series. Boston runs the reverse quite a bit too, and the Nets need to be better ducking Tatum’s screens for Smart — and maintaining their matchups. You can’t duck Smart’s screens for Tatum; that gifts Tatum easy pull-ups.
Boston mixed up its entry points to the Tatum-Smart two-man game. The Celtics surprised the Nets on two straight possessions by having Smart enter the ball to Tatum on the wing, and then scurry down to screen for him:
Smart’s pick mashes Durant, freeing Tatum. The Nets were ready for this on the next possession; Tatum preyed upon their expectations:
That Tatum spin-away is becoming one of his signatures.
For the season, Boston scored 1.401 points per possession on any trip featuring the Tatum-Smart pick-and-roll — No. 1 among 426 two-man combinations with at least 100 reps, per Second Spectrum. The Tatum-Derrick White pick-and-roll has the same effect, since White is often the hiding place for opposing point guards.
The Nets might try to avoid switching — even if it means Smart’s guy lunging to corral Tatum, briefly leaving Smart open and triggering rotations behind the play. When Brooklyn dialed in, it managed to defend without conceding the switch; this was a really nice bit of late-game defense:
Of course, Tatum can kick to Smart, and let Boston’s point guard take it from there in 4-on-3 situations. Boston has the collective passing chops now to exploit that. It’s incredible that in the span of 40 games, Boston has transformed from a team that didn’t pass enough to one that sometimes overpasses. (You can see White’s confidence in his jumper wavering.)
But Boston is still only a so-so shooting team around Tatum and Brown, and the Nets know it. They slid away from pretty much everyone else to crowd Boston’s stars, sometimes coaxing kickout passes. Brooklyn is betting on their ability to contest those shots, and on those Celtics missing:
(That’s another method of getting a small guard onto Tatum: running Tatum off a pindown from that guard’s man, in this case Grant Williams. Brooklyn has to either switch, or chase Tatum over — granting him a runway. Both are bad choices.)
Boston’s spacing around those Tatum and Brown isolations was sometimes clunky.
Brooklyn likes to mismatch hunt too; Boston just has fewer weak spots. White is a really good defender, but too short for Durant (who isn’t?) and not physical enough to disrupt Durant’s rhythm. Durant went at White every chance he got, to great effect.
Theis and Horford might be the pivot points of the series. The Celtics love to switch everything, but they have been hesitant (by their standards) to switch their bigs onto Durant and Irving. The Nets should prod that more. If Boston’s bigs drop back in pick-and-rolls, Irving and Durant rain pull-up fire.
Make enough of those, and Boston will switch. That starts an interesting cat-and-mouse game. Irving and Durant can roast Boston’s bigs off the bounce, but they sometimes choose not to — settling for pull-up 2s instead.
You can understand why:
Irving has Horford beat, but he sees a thicket of defenders. Theis leaves Drummond to clog the paint, and Smart takes an extra step from Brown to cover for Theis. That should expose Boston to some drive-and-kick meanness, but the Celtics are long, rangy, and very smart; they might be the league’s best help-and-recover team — experts at showing help without overcommitting, or revealing any easy passing lanes. Even here, they nudge Irving away from Durant, and stay within range of every Net.
Boston can also switch those bigs onto Irving and Durant, and spring hard double-teams on them — to quell a run, or just to keep Brooklyn off balance. The Celtics also tried pre-switching Horford out of pick-and-roll as his man jogged up to screen.
Swapping out one non-shooter opens the floor wide for Brooklyn. Those lineups are tiny — compromised on defense. Even the teensy four-guard lineups Brooklyn favors when Durant rests have both Bruce Brown (serving as power forward) and Claxton. Those lineups generally aligned with Tatum’s playing time — making it easier for Tatum to play mismatch ball. (I thought the Nets might try to avoid such overlap with Tatum.)
Boston stayed pretty big against those groups, producing some awkward matchups — including Horford guarding Dragic. Dragic spent most of that time chilling in the corner. The Nets might peck at that matchup by having Dragic run around pindowns, or set ball screens. Of course, the Celtics would probably switch all those actions. Boston could also go smaller, with only one of Horford, Theis, and Grant Williams. The Smart/White/Brown/Tatum/Horford group closed Game 1 and went plus-7 in 13 minutes.
With two non-shooters, the Nets have to max out on creativity and high-level anti-switch devices. Slipping screens before really setting them — getting ahead of the switch — is probably the most common anti-switch technique. Irving got one layup in Game 1 by using another: faking toward a ball screen, baiting the switch, and then zipping away from the screen — and away from both defenders. The Nets need more of that, plus the kind of set pieces that involve several players of different sizes — sewing confusion:
The other options are drastic: unearthing LaMarcus Aldridge for some combination of size and shooting (he could in theory play alongside Bruce Brown or Claxton/Drummond), or saying to hell with it and playing Durant at center with four guards.
That is where Simmons would change their team. The current Durant-at-center lineups are just too small. Simmons is 6-foot-11. He’s an elite defender and rebounder, though not quite the rim protector you’d hope (yet). He can play the Bruce Brown role on offense, only above the rim (if he’s not afraid to get fouled). He’s a good enough playmaker that the Nets might be able to play him with Brown. (The Nets have enough shooting to try Simmons with one of Claxton and Drummond in bigger lineup types.)
You can win with Irving, Curry, Guard X, Durant, and Simmons — whether Guard X is a defense-first guy like Brown, or one of Dragic and Patty Mills.
Alas, we don’t know if or when Simmons might return, or how much he’ll give. One or two such “ifs” make for an uphill battle against a team as together and buttoned-up as Boston — especially without home-court advantage. Even if Brooklyn loses tonight, it still has three of the remaining five games at home. It has the firepower to beat anyone.
It’s just hard to imagine these Celtics losing four times in five games. The Nets may need Game 2.
Tory Barron is a Bristol-based writer and editor for ESPN.com. After retiring from playing lacrosse at UConn, the DC native decided to try her hand at writing about people playing sports.
We’ll take more of that, please. The 2022 NBA playoffs have been off to a strong start, and Game 1 of the first-round playoff series between the Brooklyn Nets and Boston Celtics was no exception. The 115-114 Boston win had plenty of excitement thanks in large part to the heroics of Jayson Tatum and Kyrie Irving.
Tatum (31 points) sealed the win for the Celtics when he caught a pass from Marcus Smart, spun around and dropped in a layup just before time expired. The win marks Tatum’s fourth straight 30-point game in the playoffs dating back to last postseason. The 24-year-old ties Larry Bird in 1987 for the longest such streak in Celtics history.
On the Nets side of the equation, Irving put on a show. He scored 39 points, including 18 in the fourth quarter. Kevin Durant added 23 points but shot just 9-of-24 as Boston’s defense applied pressure, making things challenging on the Brooklyn star.
The matchup — which was tied with less than two minutes left to play — had the league talking.
LeBron James, Draymond Green, Kevin Love and more NBA stars turned to Twitter fingers to react to Kyrie’s skills, Tatum’s buzzer-beater and the possibility of six more games just like this one:
Young God-rie is so damn good at basketball man!!! INSANE SKILL!!
— LeBron James (@KingJames) April 17, 2022
Damn shame he ain’t Top 75! 🤦🏾♂️ https://t.co/jQyMvd0qXO
— LeBron James (@KingJames) April 17, 2022
Wow what a finish…
— Kevin Love (@kevinlove) April 17, 2022
Potentially 6 more games of this…? Epic
— Kevin Love (@kevinlove) April 17, 2022
This series 🔥🔥🔥🔥 JT SPIN CYCLE
— Bradley Beal (@RealDealBeal23) April 17, 2022
JT for game 😳
— Miles Bridges (@MilesBridges) April 17, 2022
What a game!!
— Miles Bridges (@MilesBridges) April 17, 2022
This series going to be good!
— Theo pinson (@tpinsonn) April 17, 2022
NBA PLAYOFFS!!! Wow 😯
— Dejounte Murray (@DejounteMurray) April 17, 2022
What a game…
— 🏁 Jamal Crawford (@JCrossover) April 17, 2022
What a game!!
— Earvin Magic Johnson (@MagicJohnson) April 17, 2022
And there’s the difference in the Celtics team. Last year Marcus Smart would’ve taken that shot. Ime got him to buy in and be the Marcus smart everyone loved out of Ok State. BEAUTIFUL! Looking like a true PG again! That’s what made Him special!