The Milwaukee Bucks were exceptionally well prepared for the Boston Celtics in a stifling Game 1 win that warped the terrain of the series.
They appeared to anticipate Boston slotting its center (Robert Williams III) onto Wesley Matthews, a potential alignment I mentioned in my preview — but one I did not expect Boston to use right away. On the Bucks’ second possession, they had Matthews screen for Jrue Holiday — testing how the Celtics wanted Williams handling pick-and-rolls, and whether he could stay in front of Holiday on a switch.
Holiday roasted him, drew help, and flicked the ball to Giannis Antetokounmpo for a hammer dunk.
On defense, the Bucks slotted Holiday onto Marcus Smart and Matthews on Jayson Tatum — allowing them to switch the Smart-Tatum two-man game. That meant Antetokounmpo would defend Jaylen Brown, and Milwaukee in past matchups preferred to keep Antetokounmpo away from Brown and Tatum — to spare him some energy, and have him on the back line.
Antetokounmpo embraced the new assignment. This series could end up the greatest testament so far to the subtle, gradual improvements Antetokounmpo has made at the edges. Even a season ago, he could not have dominated a high-stakes playoff game to the same degree — could not have been easily the best player — while shooting 9-of-25 and making only six free throws.
When the Bucks downsized midway through the first quarter — with Bobby Portis resting — they rejiggered matchups so that Grayson Allen was on Smart. Boston went immediately to the Smart-Tatum pick-and-roll, hoping to get Allen switched onto Tatum. It even had Tatum sprint out of the pick without really setting it — hoping to surprise the Bucks.
It failed. The Bucks read the play, and stayed home.
Milwaukee’s focus, size, and physicality seemed to unnerve Boston after a week against the smaller Brooklyn Nets. Even Brown and Tatum — 10-of-31 combined in Game 1, with as many total turnovers (10) as free throw attempts — appeared skittish upon arriving in the lane and seeing very large humans awaiting them.
The Celtics can rationalize some optimism for Game 2. Brown and Tatum cannot play much worse. The Bucks won Game 1 by scoring off Boston’s 18 turnovers, and a decent chunk of those were sloppy and borderline unforced. The Celtics hit 36% on 3s — about league average. They’d love to be better considering Milwaukee is leaving everyone but Brown, Tatum, and Payton Pritchard wide open, but 36% should be good enough if the Celtics clean up other areas. (Derrick White passing up open 3s is becoming a major concern. If Smart is limited in Game 2 — or can’t go at all — Boston needs more from White and Pritchard.)
Boston’s shot distribution is more alarming: 50 3s, and 34 2s. Even the peak Daryl Morey Houston Rockets are concerned.
One reason I picked Boston in six (aside from Khris Middleton’s injury) was that the Celtics’ shot selection aligns with what Milwaukee concedes. The Bucks barricade the rim; the Celtics don’t get there much, preferring 3s and midrangers. The underlying assumption was that Boston could mimic its average shot selection against Milwaukee.
That was wrong. Even a jumper-heavy offense takes about 30% of its shots from the restricted area, and makes two-thirds of them. Those points are baked into the jump-shooting equation. Without them, the math breaks. Game 1 was an example of what can befall even proficient jump-shooting teams when easy 2s are extinguished.
It didn’t feel like it, but Boston got about its normal share of shots at the basket. It just couldn’t finish; Boston hit 45% in the restricted area. Most of that was sound Milwaukee defense. Boston underperformed its expected effective field-goal percentage by the largest margin among all teams who just wrapped Game 1s, per Second Spectrum, but that tracking data may be underrating the influence of Milwaukee’s defense.
The Celtics’ midrange shots vanished. About 30% of their shots in the regular season came from the midrange. That dropped to 17% in Game 1, and almost all of them were contested floaters. They generated almost zero clean long 2s.
The Bucks were awesome chasing Boston’s best players over screens. When Tatum, Brown and Smart turned the corner, they felt defenders behind them — ready to blanket any jumper. When they hit the paint, they saw help defenders blockading the basket. Look how far Antetokounmpo is from his assignment — Grant Williams, in the right corner — when Tatum comes off a pindown from Horford:
Boston’s stars see the floor arranged this way and register three choices: floater, kickout, or take it all the way. Stars have an earned bravado. They are not afraid of Lopez or Portis. They might fear Antetokounmpo, but stars outduel other stars all the time. When they see the basket within reach, they go for it.
Some of Boston’s attempts at the rim in Game 1 were blocked. Some were wild under duress, and missed by a lot. On maybe a half-dozen such shots, the Celtics would have been better off kicking to an open shooter — and not necessarily for that guy to shoot.
Those players can take those kickout passes, drive into space, and keep the machine moving. Make one or two more passes, and the Celtics might create another shot at the rim — this time with the defense scrambling, and Milwaukee’s best rim protectors perhaps elsewhere. They might draw fouls, or pry open a clean midranger. It’s not about shooting less often at the rim. It’s about producing better looks there. (And in a few cases, wide-open corner 3s would have been better than harried, flailing shots at the basket.)
That requires starting their first action early in the shot clock, and playing with pace in the half court.
Some other things to watch in Game 2:
• The other mismatch-y thing Boston will probe is Lopez’s pick-and-roll defense. Lopez prefers hanging in the paint, but he ventured to the arc against Tatum. That seemed to surprise Tatum.
Boston should continue to prod. Lopez may revert to dropback defense at some point, exposing open pull-ups — assuming Boston’s screen-setters hit people. And if Lopez keeps creeping outside, Tatum will be prepared. He can try to jet around Lopez; cross him over inside; or jab step to get him backpedaling — before jacking an open 3. (He nailed one triple this way in Game 1.)
• Boston also smashed Lopez with a few screen-the-screener actions — pick-and-rolls on which a third Celtic (Tatum below) drills Lopez while Lopez’s man is on the way up to set a ball screen:
That delays Lopez, and messes up his footwork — allowing Boston’s ball handlers to rev up at him. They have a better chance at finishing over and around Lopez — or just drawing extra help — by going at him with a head of steam.
• Those sideline pindowns for Brown and Tatum also target Lopez. Those sets clear one side of the floor for Brown and Tatum, and give them the ball at full speed with a runway. Boston should run even more of those.
• Boston shouldn’t be afraid to use Antetokounmpo’s man as the screener when he’s guarding either Horford or Robert Williams. Engaging him on the ball is almost better than having him lurking around the rim. Make him work.
• That goes double when Antetokounmpo is on Brown — the matchup Milwaukee preferred with all three of Antetokounmpo, Portis, and Lopez on the floor. The Celtics had some success springing Brown with flare screens on Antetokounmpo. They might shift Brown a little more pick-and-roll duty, forcing Antetokounmpo to defend like a guard:
You don’t want to slide too much offense away from Tatum — Brown is better as a secondary attacker — but Boston has room to try. The Celtics might tire Antetokounmpo (if that’s possible), or lure him into silly fouls.
• It will be interesting to monitor Milwaukee’s frontcourt minutes distribution. The Antetokounmpo-Portis-Lopez trio has been a nice stopgap in Middleton’s absence, but this may become a series in which Milwaukee is more itself with two of those three on the floor. In those lineups, Antetokounmpo toggles off Brown and onto one of Boston’s bigs — an easier assignment, and one that better leverages his rim protection.
In Game 1, Milwaukee was minus-3 in 11 minutes with that big trio. It was plus-2 in eight minutes when Lopez and Antetokounmpo played without Portis, and a whopping plus-24 in 18 minutes with the Antetokounmpo/Portis pairing — and no Lopez.
• Boston might peck at Portis in the pick-and-roll more. He’s blitzing, and if Boston is prepared, it should be able to get 4-on-3s whenever it wants: have Portis’s man screen for Tatum or Brown, bait the blitz, and hit that screener slipping free to the foul line Draymond Green-style. Tatum can also try to split some Portis traps.
The Bucks could counter by switching matchups or softening Portis’s approach, but Boston has counters for all that.
• When Matthews is on Tatum, can Boston simplify some and let Tatum go one-on-one now and then — without bringing a screener into things? Tatum should be able to scoot by Matthews. It might not be something you want to bank on for 15 or 25 possessions, but it’s worth exploring.
• The Portis-Brown cross-match is an intriguing little bellwether. Boston has Brown guarding Portis when the starters are on the floor, but Milwaukee wants Portis defending Horford. Brown broke free in the open court a few times as Milwaukee searched out their favored matchups, but Brown could not finish those plays. On the flip side, Portis got Brown on a couple of post-ups.
• I wonder if Boston might rearrange matchups so Robert Williams is on Lopez instead of Matthews. Robert Williams also managed about as well as could be expected switching onto Antetokounmpo.
• I’m not really sure why Daniel Theis played in Game 1.
• Milwaukee is well built to switch Brown-Tatum actions. Even so, Boston left some meat on the bone there. Having those guys screen for each other might get Allen, Pat Connaughton, or Jevon Carter switched onto Tatum. When the starters are on the floor, those actions might even get Antetokounmpo switched onto Tatum.
Boston could then pivot right into Tatum pick-and-rolls — shoving Antetokounmpo out of his comfort zone. The Celtics went away from that matchup the few times they got it in Game 1:
Give me a Tatum-Robert Williams pick-and-roll here over Brown isolating against Holiday.
• For their part, the Bucks probably let Pritchard and White off the hook too easily. I loved this nugget from Game 1:
That’s Holiday — with White on him — getting a pair of screens from Antetokounmpo and Allen (defended by Tatum.) There’s a good chance that play ends with White or Tatum on Antetokounmpo. (Tatum is a great defender, but Boston has avoided having him guard Antetokounmpo.)
• Boston probably over-helped on Antetokounmpo isolations and post-ups — particularly on the wings.
Once Antetokounmpo picks up his dribble and turns baseline, there is no reason for Smart to double from one pass away. You’re much more likely to give up an easy 3 than to snag a steal.
Grant Williams has good intentions here; he drifts off Portis, both to help on Antetokounmpo and be around in case the second layer of help leaves a cutter open (as almost happens with Connaughton flashing into the paint.)
But he’s kind of in no man’s land, helping without really interfering.
This is easy to say from a bird’s eye view. This is Giannis freaking Antetokounmpo — the league’s premiere rim-attacking force. In a vacuum, you look at those clips and conclude: Just let him shoot a fadeaway or a floater. I mean, sure. But if you don’t show help — if you don’t at least make Antetokounmpo think — a lot of these possessions are going to end with him bulldozing someone into the basket.
And even if the Celtics did make some mistakes in over-helping — and they did — well, this is what superstars do: stress you out, sow panic, cloud your decision-making.
Also working against Boston: how far Antetokounmpo has come as a passer, including out of double-teams. Two seasons ago and maybe even last year, you might have coaxed throwaway turnovers from him — or at least gotten him to settle for reactive, non-threatening passes.
Now, he’s manipulating defenses — slinging cross-court lasers when the defense is still rotating toward him, using lookaways to trick defenders into lurching the wrong way.
That mindset has trickled across the entire Milwaukee roster. At full throttle, the Bucks have become an exquisite passing team. Their best sequences are remarkable considering how out of sorts and unfocused they looked frittering away possessions early in that classic second-round series against the Nets last season. Even score-first types like Portis are touching the ball around the floor once the Bucks have defenses rotating.
Milwaukee still suffers bouts of haziness — possessions on which the ball stalls out, Antetokounmpo settles for long jumpers, or someone ignores a glaring mismatch. Boston is good enough to bring out those bad habits.
But the Bucks played Game 1 like a confident, polished champion. Boston has dominated the league over the last 50 games, but it will need to dig deeper to win this series — starting in Game 2.