Tag Archives: Soured

How Elizabeth Holmes Soured the Media on Silicon Valley

SAN JOSE, Calif. — At the height of her acclaim in 2015, Elizabeth Holmes, the entrepreneur who founded the blood testing start-up Theranos, was named Glamour’s “Woman of the Year.” Time put her on its list of 100 luminaries. And she graced the covers of Fortune, Forbes, Inc. and T Magazine.

Theranos collapsed in scandal three years later, failing in its mission to revolutionize the health care industry. But it did change the world in another way: It helped sour the media on Silicon Valley.

That point was brought home on Thursday when Roger Parloff, a journalist who penned the Fortune cover story on Ms. Holmes and Theranos in 2014, testified in a federal courtroom in San Jose, Calif., where Ms. Holmes is on trial for 12 counts of fraud. Mr. Parloff said Ms. Holmes had made misrepresentations to him, including the volume and types of tests that Theranos could do, as well as its work with the military and pharmaceutical companies.

Theranos’s law firm, Boies Schiller, had introduced him to the start-up, Mr. Parloff said. The law firm had told him that “the real story was this remarkable company and its remarkable founder and C.E.O., Elizabeth Holmes,” he testified, looking directly at Ms. Holmes across the courtroom.

The discovery that Ms. Holmes, the tech industry’s most celebrated female entrepreneur, was misdirecting the world about her company marked a turning point in the tech press, ending a decade-long run of largely positive coverage. Reporters cringed over glowing articles they had written about tech companies that turned out to have stretched the truth, glossed over the negative consequences of their products or generally abused the trust they had enjoyed with the public.

Credit…Paul Bruinooge/Patrick McMullan, via Getty Images

“Holmes just becomes this fable of ‘You can’t just buy what they’re selling,’” said Margaret O’Mara, a professor at the University of Washington and a historian of Silicon Valley. “‘This was not what it purported to be, and we fell for it.’”

After The Wall Street Journal published exposés in 2015 and 2016 showing that Theranos was not what it appeared to be, coverage of tech companies generally became more probing.

Reporters dug into Facebook’s role in the 2016 presidential election, as well as scandals at Uber and a series of #MeToo accusations and labor uprisings at tech companies. The shift happened alongside the realization that the tech industry was no longer the niche realm of idealist computer geeks. It had become the dominant force in the global economy and needed to be held more to account.

Now as Ms. Holmes, 37, stands trial, the media’s role in Theranos’s rise and fall has been laid out in painstaking detail. Ms. Holmes used positive articles like Fortune’s to gain credibility with investors, who poured $945 million into Theranos, prosecutors have argued.

Those investors were often wowed by the media coverage. Chris Lucas, a venture capitalist whose firm had invested in Theranos, testified that reading the Fortune article had made him “very proud of the situation, proud we were involved, very proud of Elizabeth, the whole thing.” Lisa Peterson, who managed a $100 million investment in Theranos on behalf of the wealthy DeVos family, lifted language directly from the Fortune article into a report she prepared.

The media was likewise eager to embrace Ms. Holmes’s narrative of a brilliant Stanford University dropout on her way to becoming the next Steve Jobs. Here was a young, self-made female billionaire who was being compared to Einstein and Beethoven. She embraced iconography, dressing like Mr. Jobs in black turtlenecks, as well as an esoteric lifestyle, telling Mr. Parloff that she was a vegan Buddhist who eschewed coffee for green juice.

“There was a hunger for that kind of story, and she seized that opportunity and worked that very carefully,” Ms. O’Mara said.

The media’s fascination with Ms. Holmes became so intense that in 2015, her business partner and boyfriend at the time, Ramesh Balwani, who is known as Sunny, warned her that the hype was getting risky.

“FYI, I am worried about over exposure without solid substance, which is lacking right now,” Mr. Balwani wrote in a text message that was included in court filings.

Ms. Holmes brushed off the warning. Media coverage had helped Theranos with an apparent potential business deal, she wrote, adding, “The more it works the more haters will hate.”

Later that year, The Journal revealed that Theranos’s technology did not do what the start-up claimed, spurring a surprise inspection by regulators that led to the company’s unraveling.

Theranos forcefully denied The Journal’s report. On CNBC, Ms. Holmes dismissed the article as “what happens when you work to change things.” She and Mr. Balwani plotted a defamation suit, according to text messages included in court filings. Together, they led Theranos employees in chanting an expletive at John Carreyrou, The Journal’s reporter.

Soon after, Mr. Parloff published a long correction to his Fortune article outlining the ways Theranos and Ms. Holmes had misled him. He also blamed himself for not including some of Ms. Holmes’s more evasive and opaque answers to his questions.

In court, exhibits revealed that Ms. Holmes had shown Mr. Parloff the same falsified validation reports — which appeared to show that pharmaceutical companies had endorsed Theranos’s technology when they had not — that she had sent to investors. Mr. Parloff also said Ms. Holmes had told him that the military was using Theranos in Afghanistan, but that the fact was so sensitive he could not publish it or even ask Gen. James Mattis, a Theranos board member, about it. It turned out that Theranos machines were never used on battlefields.

“She was very concerned about trade secrets,” Mr. Parloff said.

Other outlets that had hailed Ms. Holmes followed Mr. Parloff’s mea culpa. Forbes revised Ms. Holmes’s net worth, once estimated at $4.5 billion, to zero. Glamour appended an update to its Woman of the Year award after the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Ms. Holmes with fraud.

Even as she faces up to 20 years in prison if convicted, Ms. Holmes continues to fight the media. Throughout the trial, her lawyers have pushed to limit Mr. Parloff’s testimony. They filed a motion to compel him to turn over all of his reporting notes, even though he had already provided recordings of his interviews with Ms. Holmes to both sides of the case under subpoena.

The goal of that motion was to show that Mr. Parloff “was colored by bias” and “a desire to blame any errors he made in his initial article on Ms. Holmes,” John Cline, a lawyer for Ms. Holmes, said in a hearing in October.

A judge denied the motion as a “fishing expedition.”

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JPMorgan sues Tesla for $162m after Musk tweets soured share deal | Tesla

JPMorgan has sued Tesla for $162.2m, accusing Elon Musk’s electric car company of “flagrantly” breaching a 2014 contract relating to stock trading options that Tesla sold to the bank.

The options, or warrants, give the holder the right to buy a company’s stock at a set “strike” price and date. The suit, filed in a Manhattan federal court, centres on a dispute over how JPMorgan repriced its Tesla warrants as a result of Musk’s notorious 2018 tweet that he was considering taking the carmaker private.

It is unusual for a major Wall Street bank to sue such a high-profile client, although JPMorgan has done relatively little business with Tesla over the past seven years, according to Tesla’s filings and Refinitiv data.

“We have provided Tesla multiple opportunities to fulfil its contractual obligations, so it is unfortunate that they have forced this issue into litigation,” a spokesperson for JPMorgan said in a statement.

Tesla did not respond to requests for comment.

The options agreement meant that if Tesla’s share price was at or above the strike price of $560 on the day the warrants expired in June and July 2021, it would owe JPMorgan the difference between the share price on that date and $560.

So, given that Tesla’s stock was worth more than $600 by June this year, JPMorgan stood to make a decent profit.

But it wants an extra $162m because it argues that the warrants contained standard provisions that allowed it to adjust the strike price downwards to protect itself against the economic effects of “significant corporate transactions involving Tesla”.

The bank argues that Musk’s tweet on 7 August 2018 that he might take Tesla private at $420 a share – at that point the shares were worth $341.99 – was just such a significant moment. With a buyout price set at $420, JPMorgan could not reach its strike price of $568 and therefore would not make any money. Accordingly, JPMorgan adjusted the strike price downwards, therefore increasing the chance of profit.

JPMorgan said in its complaint that Tesla had failed under its contract to hand over the agreed amount of its stock or cash. The bank said Tesla’s failure to do that amounted to a default.

“Though JPMorgan’s adjustments were appropriate and contractually required,” the bank’s complaint said, “Tesla has flagrantly ignored its clear contractual obligation to pay JPMorgan in full.”

JPMorgan said Tesla had replied that the bank’s adjustments to the strike price were “an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of changes in volatility in Tesla’s stock”. But Tesla did not challenge the underlying calculations, JPMorgan said.

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Robinhood Stock Sale Soured By Investor Confusion, Valuation Concern

Robinhood Markets Inc.’s

HOOD 0.95%

bid to revolutionize IPOs has created losses for investors instead, after one of the year’s most highly anticipated listings fell flat.

In a regulatory filing in early July, the trading platform’s co-founders said they would open their initial public offering to customers on equal terms with institutional investors. They said they recognized it may be the first IPO many would participate in, and pledged to “never sacrifice the safety of our customers’ money.”

It now appears Robinhood’s commitment to “democratizing” the IPO process played a role in the offering’s big initial stumble Thursday. An innovative auction system sowed some confusion among investors, many already suspicious of the valuation of a business that has drawn scrutiny from regulators and criticism from customers, people involved in the process said.

The stock, initially priced at $38, the bottom of the target range, sits below that. It is a disappointing result at a time when IPOs are booming and investor appetite for new issues is robust.

Robinhood proudly tore up the traditional IPO playbook. It insisted a large chunk of its stock—in the end up to 25%—go to its individual-investor customers compared with the normal retail allocation of well under 10%. It said employees could sell a portion of their stock right away instead of being locked up for six months. And when it came to determining the price of its IPO, Robinhood decided to use a hybrid-auction process, which attempts to assign shares to investors based on what they are willing to pay, regardless of who they are.

Robinhood co-founder Baiju Bhatt, in gray suit, and CEO and co-founder Vladimir Tenev in the Wall Street area of New York City on Thursday.

The hybrid auction has worked in other IPOs in the past year. In typical listings, underwriters give their investor clients updates throughout the roadshow—the seven- to 10-day period in which a company pitches its stock. These updates typically include guidance on how much demand bankers are seeing for the shares and the rough price they ultimately expect to set.

In this case the company and lead underwriters

Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

and

JPMorgan Chase

& Co. gave few such updates, people familiar with the matter said. When some large investors called the other underwriters on the deal, some of those bankers pleaded ignorance.

The opaqueness of the process sowed suspicion among some investors who assumed the deal was going poorly and adjusted their orders accordingly, investors and bankers said.

Many had already expressed concern about how much of Robinhood’s revenue comes from a controversial practice called payment-for-order-flow, which the Securities and Exchange Commission is reviewing, people who attended the roadshow said. Others questioned what they saw as the high valuation the eight-year-old company was seeking—in excess of $30 billion.

Another concern: whether Robinhood’s controversial decision earlier this year to stop users from buying meme stocks like

GameStop Corp.

would prompt some to eschew the offering.

Wednesday night, as bankers met with Robinhood Chief Executive

Vlad Tenev

to set the price, some investors said they were only told it would be within the $38 to $42 target range. This surprised many large institutions, who are used to more guidance heading into a pricing meeting.

A Robinhood IPO event in Times Square.

An unusually large percentage of shares were set to be allocated to hedge funds, which are more likely to “flip” IPO stock on the first day of trading, according to people close to the deal. To bring in more of the biggest institutional funds who are viewed as “buy-and-hold” investors, Robinhood chose $38 a share instead of the higher price some funds were willing to pay.

The company and Goldman felt comfortable that the lower price was conservative enough that the shares would rise on their first day of trading, especially given the buzz around Robinhood in the lead-up to the listing, according to people close to the deal.

Instead, the stock opened at $38 a share, unusual at a time when big initial pops for hot IPOs are more the norm. It rose higher briefly, touching $40 before dropping through the IPO price. It closed down 8.4% Thursday before recovering slightly Friday.

The brokerage app Robinhood has transformed retail trading. WSJ explains its rise amid a series of legal investigations and regulatory challenges. Photo illustration: Jacob Reynolds/WSJ

Robinhood’s Stock Market Debut

Write to Corrie Driebusch at corrie.driebusch@wsj.com

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